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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, AND ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
Defendant-Appellant Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully 
submits this brief in reply to the brief filed on behalf of 
plaintiffs-appellees in the above-entitled matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although defendant acknowledges that this Court reviews the 
facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989), several facts contained in 
plaintiffs' brief are either unsupported in the record or are 
recited in a potentially misleading fashion. As a result, 
defendant submits the following review of the record: 
Paragraph 1 of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates "Mr. 
Crookston continually worked 2-3 jobs and saved for many years 
until 1978 . . .." The record, on the other hand, reflects that 
Docket No. 920172 
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for at least part of the relevant time period, Mr. Crookston was 
not as industrious as plaintiffs now claim: 
Q. Was there ever a time that you had only 
one job and not two or three? 
A. I think so. There was a period of time 
that I may have, yes. I can't remember. 
(R. 1999-2000) 
Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' statement of facts infers that the 
Crookstons paid $12,000 to the Bank in order to keep costs down. 
The fact of the matter is that the Bank required the Crookstons in 
September, 1981, to pay down the original construction loan in 
order to receive an extension on their loan. (R. 2008-2009) This 
extension was necessitated by delays in the construction of their 
unique earth home. (Jd.) Due to their precarious financial 
condition at the time, plaintiffs had to borrow the bulk of the 
$12,000 from Mrs. Crookston's parents. (R„ 2009) 
Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates that 
!l[t]he Crookstons performed various services such as painting and 
finish work in order to keep costs down." The record indicates, 
however, that the house collapsed before the painting and finish 
work was initiated. (R. 2019-20, 2160) In fact, the portion of 
the record cited by plaintiffs in their brief indicates that the 
only work actually performed by plaintiffs was (1) helping the 
contractor obtain a building permit, and (2) helping direct traffic 
around a crane at the construction site. (R. 2019) 
Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates that 
plaintiffs believed that Fire Insurance "was not doing anything11 to 
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adjust the loss at the time they requested assistance from attorney 
H. Ralph Klemm. Nevertheless, attorney Klemm testified at trial 
that Fire Insurance had in fact already been working with the 
original contractor of the earth home, Kyle Brewster, in an attempt 
to obtain a repair bid, (R. 1686-1687) As a result of Mr. 
Brewster's inability to promptly provide a repair bid, Fire 
Insurance requested Mr. Klemm's assistance in obtaining other 
repair bids. (Id.) Eventually, Fire Insurance, plaintiffs, their 
attorney, and the Bank solicited bids on the repair of the 
plaintiffs' unique earth home. Without exception, each experienced 
difficulties in obtaining detailed, competent bids (R. 1687-1688, 
1976-1977, 2035, 2557) 
Paragraph 11 of plaintiffs' statement of facts infers that the 
testimony of Argen Jager establishes that very little of the 
remains of the earth home were salvageable, by stating, "He had to 
completely tear out the interior due to the extensive damage and 
was able to salvage very little . . . .fl Mr. Jager testified that 
he had to remove the interior of the earth home because he entirely 
changed the design of the house and constructed a conventional home 
in its place. (R. 2667-2668) 
Paragraph 25(f) of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates 
that Fire Insurance's adjuster "had the audacity to expressly state 
that he felt good about what he did to the Crookstons!" The record 
reveals that such a statement was never made at trial: 
Q. How long did it take to have your 
deposition taken, sir? 
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A. As I recall, I was there on two different 
days, the better part of two days. 
Q. Were you nervous? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Are you nervous right now? 
A. Yes. 
-k "k -k 
Q. (By Mr. Roybal) Have you been nervous a 
lot of times? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you lost sleep over this? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At any time, to anyone, have you ever 
lied? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever not told the truth? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you feel good about what you did? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have concerns all along about the 
Crookstons? 
A. Yes. Our main concern is always for our 
policyholder. 
(R. 2285-2286) 
The adjuster's testimony when viewed in the context of the 
line of questioning posed at trial clearly does not state that "he 
felt good about what he did to the Crookstons," as claimed by 
plaintiffs. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ordinarily overruling decisions are to be applied 
retroactively. This Court in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), articulated a standard for defining the 
"reasonable and rational relationship11 requirement between punitive 
and compensatory awards. On remand, Fire Insurance requested that 
it be permitted a new jury trial utilizing the Crookston standards. 
The trial court refused. The trial court's refusal was in error 
and constituted an abuse of discretion. 
The punitive award in this case represents the most flagrant 
deviation from the historical pattern of punitive damage awards in 
the history of this state. The deviation is significant both in 
terms of the sheer size of the award and the ratio the $4.0 million 
punitive award bears to the compensatory damages, especially the 
"hard" actual damages, in this case. Such a gross deviation from 
the historical pattern requires a finding that the award was the 
result of passion and prejudice. 
The trial court erred in considering and adopting in its order 
facts and unreasonable inferences wholly outside the record. The 
court's reliance on such facts constitutes a separate ground for 
reversal of the denial of defendant's motion for new trial or 
remittitur. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
FIRE INSURANCE SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETRY 
THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO A NEW JURY. 
Plaintiffs assert that a new trial by jury on the amount of 
punitive damages is unwarranted because the pre-Crookston standards 
for awarding punitive damages were constitutionally sound, the 
Crookston presumptive ratio standard is to be used solely by trial 
judges, the plaintiffs and the judicial system would be 
inconvenienced by such a retrial. Fire Insurance, on the other 
hand, maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing Fire Insurance a new trial on the amount of punitive 
damages. 
The punitive damage award in this case is unparalleled in the 
history of the judicial system of the state of Utah. This Court 
acknowledged that the shocking award of $4.0 million clearly 
exceeded the general pattern of punitive damage awards made in this 
state since statehood. In the nearly 100 years since statehood, no 
award of punitive damages has so clearly stood out as being 
excessive as this one. In fact, the amount of the award, without 
consideration for accrued post-judgment interest while on appeal, 
is eight times greater than the next highest affirmed verdict. See 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
The jury's award of $4.0 million was the direct result of 
defendant's mistaken claims handling and a deficient judicial 
standard for awarding punitive damages. This Court in Crookston 
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noted repeatedly the deficiencies in the traditional "list of 
factors11 standard used by the jury in setting the punitive damage 
award in this case. Although this Court refused to pass on 
defendant's assorted constitutional challenges to the punitive 
damage award, the Court did acknowledge the need for a new 
approach, a new standard, to provide greater direction to juries in 
making punitive awards and to judges in reviewing the propensity of 
a jury award. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808. 
The issue of whether defendant is entitled to a new jury trial 
boils down to basic fairness under the law. Fire Insurance 
maintains that it is patently unfair for one trier of fact to set 
the initial award of punitive damages under one standard and then 
to permit a reviewing court to pass upon the propriety of the award 
with another judicial standard. The original jury verdict was 
rendered by a jury that was given very little guidance on the 
"reasonable and rational relationship" requirement that must exist 
between an award of punitive damages and the actual damages in a 
case. On the other hand, Judge Frederick was specifically directed 
to take into account the need for such a reasonable and rational 
relationship between the punitive and compensatory damages. It is 
impossible to speculate with any degree of accuracy what the 
original jury would have done if it had been instructed under the 
guidelines set forth in the Crookston opinion. 
While the pre-Crookston "list of factors" standard may have 
met constitutional muster against a federal due process challenge, 
this Court's action in remanding the case to the trial court for 
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further consideration in light of Crookston creates significant 
constitutional concerns. If this Court and the trial court review 
the excessiveness of the punitive damage award under the Crookston 
standards, the parties will be effectively denied procedural 
fairness, due process, and the right to trial by jury. 
Plaintiffs' contention that a jury is ill-equipped to apply 
the Crookston presumptive ratio standard is ill-founded and 
unsupportable. The reasonable and rational relationship 
requirement defined in Crookston would help insure that juries 
carefully deliberate before awarding punitive damages in excess of 
the suggested ratios. If a jury knows the presumptive ratio ahead 
of time and then chooses to make an award in excess of the ratio, 
the award would strongly suggest that the jury considered the 
matter an unusual case worthy of such a deviation. Furthermore, a 
jury should be instructed as to the significance of the distinction 
between "hard11 and "soft" type compensatory damages and take that 
distinction into account when fixing a punitive damage award. On 
remand, defendant suggested such jury instructions to the trial 
court. (R. 3189-90) It can scarcely be said that jurors who are 
competent to distinguish between general and special damages or 
hard and soft damages in affixing compensatory awards are somehow 
ill-equipped to make such distinctions when making punitive damage 
awards. 
Plaintiffs assert that it would be unfair to now, some eleven 
years after the collapse of their home, to require them to retry 
the amount of punitive damages. Plaintiffs assert that court 
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dockets would be adversely affected if this matter were to be 
retried. The issue is not whether plaintiffs will be somehow 
disadvantaged by being required to retry this case. Plaintiffs 
cannot dispute that upon payment of the compensatory award, they 
were made whole. Since plaintiffs already have been made whole, 
this issue is simply whether plaintiffs intend to prosecute this 
matter further in order to promote the public policy concerns of 
punishment and deterrence. Clearly, even if this case is remanded 
for a new trial, no one is forcing plaintiffs to proceed further 
against their will. Since they have been made whole, any further 
prosecution of this matter would be presumably merely for the 
betterment of society, rather than for the benefit of plaintiffs' 
financial standing. The impact of any retrial of the issue of 
punitive damages would be minimal at best on plaintiffs and the 
resources of the judicial system of the state of Utah. 
This Court in Loyal Order of Moose No. 2 59 v. County Board, 
657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982), acknowledged that overruling 
decisions should ordinarily be applied retroactively. Plaintiffs 
pose various arguments against the application of the Crookston 
standards to the very case which gave rise to these new standards. 
While state and federal constitutions do not apparently require a 
new trial by jury utilizing the Crookston standards, notions of 
fair play and justice suggest strongly such a result. Under such 
circumstances, the trial court should have permitted a new jury to 
pass on the issue of punitive damages. In failing to permit a new 
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trial by jury under the Crookston standards, the trial court abused 
its discretion, 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO REMIT THE UNPRECEDENTED AWARD OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE. 
The punitive award in this case represents the most flagrant 
deviation from the historical pattern of punitive damages awards in 
the history of the state of Utah. The deviation is significant 
both in terms of the sheer size of the award and the ratio the 
punitive award bears to the compensatory damages in the case. 
A. Sheer Size of the Punitive Damage Award Required a Remittitur 
On June 11, 1987, judgment was entered against Fire Insurance 
in the amount of $4 million in punitive damages. The jury's award 
is eight times greater than the next highest award ever affirmed by 
this Court in Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985) 
($500,000 punitive award affirmed), and 20 times greater than the 
second highest affirmed award in Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching, 
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) ($200,000 punitive award affirmed). 
In Crookston, this Court noted that the punitive award in this 
case "is far greater than the awards reduced in many prior cases" 
and "exceeds the bounds of the general pattern set by . . . prior 
decisions." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 801, 807 (emphasis added). It 
is well established that punitive damages are a harsh remedy and 
not normally favored in law. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Inc. v. 
Beadles, 731 P.2d 572 (Alaska 1987); Rosener v. Sears Roebuck and 
Co. , 110 Cal.3d 740, 168 Cal.Rptr. 237 (1980); Sere v. Group 
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Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33 (D.C. Ct.App. 1982); Cheney v. 
Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983); 
Tucker v. Illinois Power Co., 232 Ill.App.3d 15, 597 N.E.2d 220 
(1992); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454 (Miss. 
1983); Home Ins. Co. v. American Home Products Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 
196, 551 N.Y.Supp.2d 481, 550 N.E.2d 930 (1990); Becker v. Pearson, 
241 Or. 215, 405 P.2d 534 (1965). Since punitive awards are not 
favored, this Court has correctly observed that large punitive 
awards should be scrutinized closely. Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 810. 
The trial court in this case has now been given two 
opportunities to either order a new trial on the issue of punitive 
damages or to reduce the unprecedented punitive damage award. The 
trial court has twice refused to grant any such relief to 
defendant. Although the trial court must be accorded some 
discretion on ruling on the excessiveness of a punitive damage 
award because of the court's advantaged position during trial, less 
discretion should be accorded to the trial court on the review of 
a punitive damage award. See Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 62, 2 67 
P.2d 759, 766 (1954). 
In this case, this Court is now faced squarely with a punitive 
damage award 8 0 0% greater than any other award ever affirmed by 
this Court. Plaintiffs contend that such an unprecedented award is 
required due to the nature of defendant's conduct and the size and 
nature of defendant's business. Such factors are wholly 
insufficient to sustain the staggering award of punitive damages in 
this case. Historical patterns developed in punitive damage cases 
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in this state over nearly 100 years, and more especially in the 
modern era, clearly demonstrate that the jury's verdict in this 
case and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial or remit 
the damage award, were unsupportable. Prior deviations from the 
historical patterns by themselves have in the past been sufficient 
for this Court to conclude that the awards were the result of 
passion and prejudice. Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 810. Under such 
circumstances, this Court has been required to step in and reduce 
the awards directly or to order a new trial. This Court should, 
therefore, order either a remittitur or a new trial on the issue of 
punitive damages in this case. 
B. The Lack of a Reasonable and Rational Relationship 
In addition to the unprecedented size of the punitive award in 
this case, the ratio between punitive damages and the compensatory 
damages awarded by the jury in this case is unsupportable and 
demands that this Court remit the punitive damage award or grant 
defendant a new trial. This Court in Crookston identifies more 
than 2 0 reported punitive damage cases in the state of Utah which 
have produced "fairly predictable results11 on the required ratio 
that should exist between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages. Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 809, 810. By law, punitive 
damages must generally bear a "reasonable and rational 
relationship" to the actual damages awarded at trial. Id. In 
reviewing the "language and pattern of results" from prior 
decisions of this Court, this Court found the following presumptive 
ratios exist: 
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The general rule to be drawn from our past 
cases appears to be that where the punitives 
are well below $100,000, punitive damage 
awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages 
have seldom been upheld and that where the 
award is in excess of $100,000, we have 
indicated some inclination to overturn awards 
having ratios of less than 3 to 1, 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The following chart identifies the specific action taken by 
this Court in the punitive damage cases identified in footnote 24 
of the Crookston opinion: 
Case 
Von Hake v. 
Thomas 
Jensen v. 
Pioneer Dodge 
Synergetics 
v. Marathon 
Bundy v. 
Century 
Equipment 
Nelson v. 
Jacobsen 
Cruz v. 
Montoya 
Branch v. 
Western 
Petroleum 
Leigh 
Furniture 
v. Isom 
Jury Award 
(p.d. = punitive 
damages, 
comp. = compensatory 
damages) 
$500,000 p.d. 
$487,000 comp. 
$100,000 p.d. 
$1,234.50 + $50/ 
day comp.1 
$200,000 p.d. 
$452,000 comp. 
$75,000 p.d. (trial 
court remitted to 
$25,000), $2,133 comp. 
$25,000 p.d. 
$59,600 comp. 
$12,000 p.d. 
$9,579.89 comp. 
$13,000 p.d. 
$18,750 comp. 
$35,000 p.d. (trial 
court remitted to 
$13,000) $65,000 
comp. 
Ratio Punitive 
Damages to 
Compensatory 
Damages 
1.03 to 1 
81 to 1 
.44 to 1 
11.7 to 1 
.42 to 1 
1.25 to 1 
.69 to 1 
.54 to 1 
Appellate 
Action Taken 
on Punitive 
Damage Award 
Affirmed 
Reversed and 
remanded 
Affirmed 
Remanded 
Reversed and 
Remanded 
Reduced 
punitive award 
to $6,000 
Affirmed 
Reinstated 
jury award 
Per diem damages would have exceeded $70,000 at time of opinion. As a 
result, ratio was likely 1.4 to 1. 
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Case 
First 
Security Bank 
v. JBJ 
Feedyards 
Clayton v. 
Crossroads 
Equip, Co. 
Elkington 
v, Foust 
Terry v. 
ZCMI 
Kesler v. 
Rogers 
Prince v. 
Peterson 
Holdaway 
v. Hall 
Powers v. 
Taylor 
DeVas v. 
Noble 
Nance v. 
Sheet Metal 
Workers Int'l 
Assoc. 
Holland v. 
Moreton 
Ostertaq 
v. LaMont 
Sadlier v. 
Knapton 
Wilson v. 
Oldroyd 
Jury Award 
(p.d. = punitive 
damages, 
comp. = compensatory 
damages) 
$100,000 p.d. 
$36,564.60 comp. 
$20,000 p.d. 
$27,500 comp. 
$30,000 p.d. 
$12,000 comp. 
$15,000 p.d. (trial 
court remitted to 
$2,000), $6,500 comp. 
$10,000 p.d. 
$25,403.17 comp. 
$3,000 p.d. 
$5,537 comp. 
$5,000 p.d. 
$10,683.50 comp. 
$2,500 p.d. (trial 
court remitted to 
$1,500), 1,350 comp. 
$750 p.d. 
$200 comp. 
No damages (trial 
court award $1 
nominal damages, 
$14,000 in 
attorneys' fees, 
and $40,000 p.d. 
$25,000 p.d. 
$95,833 comp. 
$2,000 p.d. (trial 
court remitted to 
$860), $140 comp. 
$2,000 p.d. 
$8,000 comp. 
$25,000 p.d. 
$50,000 comp. 
Ratio Punitive 
Damages to 
Compensatory 
Damages 
2.7 to 1 
,73 to 1 
2.5 to 1 
2.3 to 1 
,39 to 1 
.54 to 1 
,47 to 1 
1.1 to 1 
3.7 to 1 
40,000 to 1 
,26 to 1 
6.14 to 1 
.25 to 1 
1 to 2 
Appellate 
Action Taken 
on Punitive 
Damage Award 
Reduced award 
to $50,000 
Affirmed 
Affirmed 
Reinstated 
jury award 
Reduced award 
to $5,000 
Reduced award 
to $5,000 
Affirmed 
Affirmed 
Affirmed 
Reversed and 
r e i n s t a t e d 
j u r y ' s f inding 
of no damages 
Affirmed 
Affirmed 
Affirmed 
Reduced punitive 
award to $5,000 
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Jury Award 
(p.d. = punitive Ratio Punitive Appellate 
damages, Damages to Action Taken 
comp. = compensatory Compensatory on Punitive 
Case damages ) Damages Damage Award 
Evans v. $1,499.95 p.d. 1.1 to 1 Affirmed 
Gaisford $lf000 comp. (trial 
court remitted 
p.d. to $1,000 and 
comp. to $900) 
At the present time, the $4.0 million punitive award bears 
more than a 4.9 to 1 relationship to the compensatory award, which 
this Court has already recognized was "admittedly liberal." 
Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 806-807, fn. 22. Plaintiffs and even the 
trial court on remand have sought to recompute and recharacterize 
the "actual damages" in this case in order to bring the punitive 
award within the presumptive ratio. Such attempts have, however, 
failed. 
With the exception of Ostertaq v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 
P. 2d 1022 (1959) (Upholding punitives of $860 to actual damages of 
$140) and DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962) 
(Upholding punitives of $750 to actual damages of $200), no 
reported decision listed by this Court in Crookston has sustained 
a jury verdict with a ratio greater than the presumptive ratios 
enunciated in Crookston. The punitive damage award in this case 
stands out in stark defiance of this Court's prior pronouncements 
that punitive damages should bear a reasonable and rational 
relationship to actual damages sustained. Absent such a 
relationship, this Court in the past has been required to label 
such deviant verdicts as "grossly disproportionate" and "the result 
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of passion and prejudice." The trial court's refusal to remit the 
punitive damage award or to grant a new trial in this case was an 
abuse of discretion because such damages do not bear a reasonable 
and rational relationship to the compensatory damages in this case. 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to 
Distinguish Between "Hard" Damages and "Soft" Damages 
The instant case presents an even more compelling case for 
this Court to modify the punitive damage award because of the 
significant amount of "soft" damages already awarded to plaintiffs. 
While a trial court may not be bound to reduce a punitive damage 
award merely because it exceeds the presumptive ratios set forth in 
Crookston, a reviewing court should carefully examine the 
distinction between "hard" and "soft" actual damages in determining 
the appropriateness of a punitive damage award. Crookston, 817 
P. 2d at 811, fn. 29. Where actual damages are largely "soft," this 
Court should be reluctant to uphold punitive awards "that might 
survive scrutiny if the actual damages involved were 'hard.'" Id. 
In this case, plaintiffs' compensatory damages of $815,826 were 
approximately 60% "soft" and 40% "hard." The punitive award in 
this case bears an approximately 12.4 to 1 relationship to the hard 
damages. The trial court's refusal to remit the punitive damage 
award in this case, even where the "less than 3 to 1" ratio is 
suspect, is compelling evidence that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Fire Insurance's motion for new trial or 
remittitur. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON FACTS 
AND UNREASONABLE INFERENCES OUTSIDE THE RECORD 
IN SUPPORT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS OF 
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE. 
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court's ruling on defendant's 
motion for new trial or remittitur and the jury's initial 
unprecedented punitive damage award were reasonable because of the 
need to punish defendant and to deter further misconduct by 
defendant.2 Plaintiffs assert that defendant can only be punished 
by a large monetary award. Likewise, plaintiffs assert that future 
misconduct on the part of defendant cannot be deterred until and 
unless the jury's original $4.0 million punitive award is affirmed. 
In order to arrive at these assertions, plaintiffs invited the 
trial court to engage in groundless speculation and conjecture 
about defendant's propensity to engage in future misconduct, 
defendant's attitude towards this litigation, defendant's attitude 
towards its employees who made mistakes in the handling of 
plaintiffs' claim, and a whole host of other factors. 
Plaintiffs baldly assert that defendant, because of the nature 
of its business, has the opportunity to engage in further similar 
misconduct. The record is clear that one of the complicating 
factors in this case was the uniqueness of the loss. All the 
parties, including plaintiffs, experienced difficulty in obtaining 
2Plaintiffs' analysis of the traditional "list of factors" standards as 
further supporting the present punitive award is addressed in Fire Insurance's 
initial brief, pp. 11-24. 
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competent and complete repair bids on the destroyed structure. The 
uniqueness" of the circumstances presented in this case suggests the 
unlikelihood of similar misconduct in the future. While defendant 
continues to handle numerous claims throughout Utah and the United 
States, there was no evidence presented to the jury to suggest that 
the mistakes of the defendant's employees were part of any pattern 
of fraud or other wrongdoing. The uniqueness of the circumstances 
presented in this case militates in favor of a remittitur. See 
Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiffs also assert that a large award is required in order 
to deter further misconduct because defendant has built-in 
financial incentives to cheat and chisel its insureds on claims. 
No such evidence was presented at trial. Common sense and reason 
suggests that in a highly competitive business, there is no 
reasonable incentive to engage in conduct similar to that for which 
defendant is now being punished. The disincentive to cheat or 
chisel one's own insureds is demonstrated that a $21,612 
underpayment has now been parlayed into a multi-million dollar 
judgment against defendant. 
Plaintiffs continue to assert that defendant should be 
punished because there has been "no indication of contrition or 
remorse11 on the part of defendant and its employees. Plaintiffs 
point to the promotion of the claims adjusters who handled 
plaintiffs' claims and defendant's alleged failure to "voluntarily 
take any action to rectify the wrongs" or "reprimand the 
perpetrators" as evidence of a calculated and calloused attitude 
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which merits severe punishment by this court. Plaintiffs 
successfully urged the trial court to assume that the promotions of 
defendant's employees were attempts to "applaud" the misconduct and 
the result of those employees' "record of improving profits for 
Fire Insurance." (R. 3204) Plaintiffs also successfully urged the 
trial court to assume that "to this day [defendant] has failed or 
refused to recognize the wrong it has wrought upon the plaintiffs." 
(R. 3218) The record, however, on each of these "facts" is silent. 
Likewise, even if these "facts" are viewed as merely inferences 
drawn by Judge Frederick from the facts in the record, such 
inferences were unreasonable. 
The trial court's nearly verbatim adoption of plaintiffs' 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for new trial or 
remittitur into the court's order resulted in the trial court's 
order being based upon facts and inferences wholly without record 
support. (See R. 3094-3177, 3197-3219, 3238-3243) In such cases, 
the trial court's reliance on such facts provides a separate ground 
for reversal. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805, n. 19. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Fire Insurance Exchange 
respectfully requests that this Court either grant defendant a new 
trial on the issue of punitive damages utilizing the Crookston 
standards or that this Court order a remittitur of the 
unprecedented award of punitive damages in this case. 
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